Translator notes are bracketed [Handwritten notes on the margins – illegible]

Top secret SPECIAL FILE "To be returned on 9 of September, 1969, #2682", Central Committee, Special department [stamped on the right side]

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USSR
Committee
For State Security
of the USSR Council of Ministers
9 September 1969
#2273-A
Moscow
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Memo from Andropov to the Central Committee #2273-A of 9 September 1969.

CC CPSU

The Committee for State Security reporting on a meeting between a KGB source and "Krupp" corporation director, count ARNIM von ZEDWITZ, which took place at the request of the latter in May this year in the Netherlands.

ZEDWITZ is a confidant of BAHR, a prominent member of the German Social-Democratic party, who handles the planning, coordination and study of key issues of West German foreign policy. ZEDWITZ stated that he had approached the source at Bahr's direct request in the hope that the entire content of the discussion would be relayed to the Soviet leadership. Citing Bahr, ZEDWITZ said the following:

"The more sensible" leaders of the SPD have reached the conclusion that it is essential to seek new ways in the conduct of "Ostpolitik" and wish to establish direct and reliable channels of contact with Moscow.

According to some opinions in West Germany, recent official contacts have yielded negligible results, because each side, due to its official position, has done little other than to make "purely propagandistic" declarations. Contacts with embassy officials in Bonn are also undesirable: it is difficult to maintain them unofficially, and information of any meetings provides immediate ammunition for the political opposition.

In view of this, Bahr feels it would be desirable

to conduct a series of unofficial negotiations with representatives of the USSR, which would place neither side under any obligations should the talks yield no positive results.

ZEDWITZ states that there are forces within West German industrial circles who are prepared to assist the normalization of relations with the USSR, but their opportunities are limited in that the economic ties between West Germany and the USSR are still "embryonic".

In ZEDWITZ's opinion, the Soviet Union does not make sufficient use of the levers of foreign trade in reaching its political goals, though even now it would be possible to employ measures to exclude the participation of German specialists in the Chinese missile and nuclear programs, and also to counteract West German politicians' tendency to flirt with MAO.

According to available data, the leadership of another party in power in West Germany - the CDU - is also taking steps to establish unofficial contacts with Soviet representatives and has expressed a willingness to conduct "a broad dialogue to clarify many issues" for both sides.

Analysis of available information gives evidence that two leading, competing West German parties fear that their political opponents will seize the initiative in the matter of regulating relations with the Soviet Union, and are prepared to conduct unofficial negotiations, unmentioned in the press, which could later serve to strengthen their situation and prestige.

Consequently, the KGB feels that it would be appropriate to continue unofficial contacts with the leadership of both parties. In the course of the development of such contacts it would be advantageous, using our foreign trade possibilities, to try to exert a profitable influence on West German foreign policy, and also to ensure a flow of information about the positions and plans of the Bonn leadership.

We request authorization.

CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMITTEE FOR STATE SECURITY

ANDROPOV